Acknowledgments
Protect the People would like to thank Ambassador Melanne Verveer and Mayesha Alam for commissioning this paper as part of the Occasional Paper Series: Women’s Economic Participation in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Settings, January 2016. Many thanks to the talented editing team at Georgetown including Roslyn Warren, Alexandra Z. Safr, and Tricia Correia for their work on this paper. PTP dedicates this paper to the brave women of Syria, and all Syrian people working toward a better future.

Cover Photo Credits:
The Future of Syria - Birth registration and statelessness, UNHCR/S. Rich/April 2013
Knitting a brighter future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Russell Watkins/DFID
Providing access to support for Syrian girls and women at risk of gender-based violence and early or forced marriage, Russell Watkins/DFID

Inside Cover Photo Credit: Syrian refugees face an uncertain future, Mohamed Azakir/World Bank

Introduction

Raging for roughly five years, the Syrian civil war has resulted in more than 220,000 deaths and an estimated 4.6 million refugees pouring out of Syria.

What began as a pro-democracy movement to oust President Bashar al-Assad at the height of the Arab Spring in 2011 has since spiraled into the devastating Syrian civil war that has rocked countries across the region and the world. The vacuum of power left by the ongoing violence and the corresponding rise of militant groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), further dismantle any semblance of stability in the country and region. Raging for roughly five years, the Syrian civil war has resulted in more than 220,000 deaths and an estimated 4.6 million refugees pouring out of Syria into the larger Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as into Europe. As Syrians take refuge outside of Syria, they find themselves in precarious economic conditions, as many refugee-hosting countries in the region bar them from securing steady employment. This is especially challenging for Syrian women refugees.

Using the employment data available on Syrians, those living inside Syria and those living in exile in host countries across MENA, this paper sheds light on how Syrian women cope with the instability that has engulfed their daily lives as a result of the Syrian civil war. Focusing on where Syrian refugees are most concentrated (Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey), the data shows that host countries largely bar Syrian refugees from formal work opportunities, in part because these host countries’ infrastructures cannot handle the current and ongoing influx of refugees pouring out of Syria, and also because of the corresponding social tensions over job competition between the host country population and Syrian refugees. Such legal barriers make it deeply challenging for Syrian refugees to establish themselves economically in countries they may reside in for decades.

Zooming in on the little gender-disaggregated data available, this article reveals that Syrian refugee women find themselves doubly disadvantaged under these conditions. As this article shows, in addition to the legal constraints all Syrian refugees face when seeking employment, the social norms that surround women working outside the home and the coping mechanisms of families in crisis compound the vulnerabilities of Syrian women refugees.

This article begins by reviewing the economic and social data on Syrian women, comparing the status of women still living inside Syria and Syrian refugee women living in neighboring host countries, as well as situating Syrian women's employment data within available labor statistics for the MENA region. It then focuses explicitly on the economic conditions of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. In doing so, it shows that across MENA Syrian refugees face legal restrictions that bar them from becoming full, legal participants in their host country economies. Despite the very limited gender-disaggregated data available, this article unveils how Syrian women refugees are specifically affected in these host countries, focusing acutely on the compounding social challenges of their status as women and their status as refugees. Directly following, this article discusses the role of the international community in addressing the economic needs of the refugee population, with a particular focus on women. Finally, the article closes by highlighting the key issues that hamper Syrian refugees, and women in particular, from achieving gainful employment amidst this protracted crisis.

---

**Women in the Syrian Workforce**

Syrian women fall behind other women in the Middle East when it comes to labor force participation.

Historically, Syrian women are not particularly active in the workforce. As of 2013, 13.5 percent of women were active in the Syrian labor force, compared to 72.7 percent of men, according to data collected by the United Nations (UN).\(^3\) Earlier, pre-crisis data taken in 2005, showed both female and male participation in the labor force as slightly higher but similarly out of balance, at 16.3 percent and 76.1 percent respectively.\(^4\) The reduction of women in the workforce between 2005 and 2013 aligns with increases in overall unemployment in Syria since the war began. Unemployment in Syria went from 9.2 percent in 2005 to 10.8 percent in 2013.\(^5\) Unsurprisingly, for both men and women, the war has reduced economic activity and formal employment opportunities inside the country.

As the World Bank data (below) indicates, Syrian women fall behind other women across the region when it comes to labor force participation.\(^6\) In general, 22 percent of women are active in the labor force across MENA, the lowest regional average across the world. Within MENA, Syria has the lowest percentage of women participating in its economy.

**FIGURE 1. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, FEMALE** (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION AND AGES 15+)


\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Ibid.


Research suggests social and political factors limit women’s participation in the Syrian economy. Despite the fact that Syrian women obtain high levels of education – 63.1 percent of girls attend secondary school, compared to 62.8 percent of boys – political and social barriers block them from entering the workforce.\(^8\) Although the Syrian constitution calls for equality between all citizens, the penal code allows a husband to forbid his wife from working outside the home.\(^9\) In addition, social norms dictate that Syrian men provide for their families, which relegate women’s work to the domestic sphere and limit their access to public life.\(^10\) Surveys conducted inside Syria show that people believe a woman should only work outside the home if her husband cannot support the family.\(^11\)

Due to these legal and social barriers, Syrian women who do work outside the home are limited to specific sectors of the economy. These women mainly work in agriculture, education, textile, or clerical positions.\(^12\) Their opportunities in the political, financial, and legal fields are limited. Syrian women comprise only 10 percent of ministerial positions, 11 percent of diplomatic posts, and 13 percent of all judgeships.\(^13\)

The restrictive political environment also limits their participation in civil society and the formation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While these spaces are generally places where women actively participate in large numbers, formal participation in such organizations inside Syrian are limited to those who are closely aligned with the Ba’ath party and the Assad regime. For example, First Lady Asma al-Assad has founded several organizations focusing on women’s economic empowerment, including Modernizing and Activating Women’s Role in Economic Development (MAWRED). However, women who can join or benefit from MAWRED and similar NGOs usually must have ties to the regime. Humanitarian organizations working inside Syria since the conflict began in 2011 report that more women are participating in the local governing councils and civil society organizations, but this varies by location depending on who is in control of the territory.\(^14\)

Over the course of the last five years, the civil war has placed new economic burdens on Syrian women. Because the majority of those who have died in the war are men,\(^15\) Syrian women and children must play more active roles outside the home to meet the needs of their families. According to 2013 data, the number of women working inside Syria (13 percent) doubled the number of refugee women working in neighboring host countries, estimated at 6 percent in parts of Lebanon\(^16\) and 7 percent in Jordan.\(^17\) As the data suggests, women inside Syria are increasingly stepping outside their pre-established social roles to support their families, while Syrian refugees generally (and refugee women in particular) face unique challenges of securing gainful employment. Syrian Refugees Since 2011, refugees have steadily flowed out of Syria, generally settling across MENA and, more recently, migrating to Europe. According to January

---

\(^10\) Analysis based on author’s experience speaking with a number of NGOs running women’s programs in the region and reading project papers and news articles with testimony from Syrian women about barriers they face.
\(^13\) Ibid.
\(^14\) Based on the author’s experience speaking with NGO leaders operating inside Syria.
2016 data, of the 4.6 million Syrian refugees, over 800,000 or 17.6 percent of all Syrian refugees sought asylum in Europe.\(^{18}\) However, only 17 percent of these refugee arrivals to Europe are women.\(^{19}\) This figure is alarming to refugee humanitarian agencies in the MENA region, who are seeing an increase in female-headed households as Syrian men leave the region to find work in Europe.\(^{20}\) Despite what appears to be a massive influx of refugees arriving to Europe, the vast majority of Syrian refugees remain scattered across the MENA region – in Lebanon (25.5 percent),\(^{21}\) Jordan (14.4 percent),\(^{22}\) Turkey (40 percent),\(^{23}\) and Iraq (6.3 percent).\(^{24}\)

These MENA host countries resist integrating refugees into the workforce for fear of how such integration will impact their own citizens economically.\(^{25}\) For example, in Lebanon, the influx of refugees into the labor market has resulted in a 60 percent decrease in wages for Lebanese nationals, causing social tensions between refugees and the host community.\(^{26}\) In Jordan, prior to the influx of Syrian refugees (2010-2013), the International Labour Organization (ILO) found that employment generation had not kept pace with labor force growth, resulting in especially high unemployment rates for women and youth.\(^{27}\) Correspondingly, the ILO predicts that the Syrian refugee influx “has the potential to result in larger scale displacement of vulnerable Jordanians from the labour [sic] market.”\(^{28}\) These host countries, thus, limit the extent to which refugees can legally participate in their economies. This constrained economic environment for refugees has directly led Syrian male refugees to migrate to Europe.\(^{29}\)

In Europe, the asylum process allows refugees to obtain a legal status, which theoretically would allow an individual, if recognized as a refugee, to legally work within the host country. A similar process is not in place in many of the host countries in the Middle East. For example, refugees cannot legally work in Lebanon, they have incredibly limited legal employment opportunities in Jordan, and they only obtained the legal right to work in Turkey in January 2016.\(^{30}\)

Without the right to work, it is increasingly difficult for refugees to pay rent and meet their basic food needs. In the first years of exile, refugees generally rely on their savings and remittances from relatives

living abroad. However, as these coping mechanisms dry up and the civil war persists, more refugees are likely to move to other countries in the region and beyond to look for work.

The policies denying men the right to work in countries of first asylum directly leads to increased migration of refugee men to Europe, placing women in increasingly difficult economic conditions. Humanitarian agencies that support refugees living in MENA host countries note a marked increase in women who have become the head of household due to a spouse or other male relatives going to Europe to look for work. Many female refugees stay behind to care for their families in hopes of receiving remittances from male relatives once they are established in Germany or other European countries. Enabling greater female participation in the workforce is a sustainable approach to helping Syrian women meet the needs of their families, especially as they wait for remittances that may never come.31

Instead, however, Syrian refugee women face a series of social barriers that inhibit their economic advancement. This includes social perceptions around who is believed to be an appropriate person to work outside the home as well as the corresponding personal security implications around gender and work. Refugee women in neighboring host countries state that community perceptions of “working women” deter them from seeking employment.32 Syrian refugee women also report that they fear leaving their home due to harassment and requests for sexual favors in place of rent and other commodities.33

The data presented in the following section evidences the implications of the legal barriers affecting all Syrian refugees in MENA host countries as well as the social barriers that further prevent women from working.

Employment Data on Syrian Refugees in Host Countries

The UNHCR and NGOs working in the field carefully assess the economic conditions of the refugee populations they aim to support.

Data on refugee employment and livelihood varies by agency and location. While the ILO analyzed the impact of refugees on host economies, including Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs working in the field also carefully assess the economic conditions of the refugee populations they aim to support. Overall, there is a fundamental lack of reliable, as well as sex- and age-disaggregated, data on the economic status of Syrian refugees. The following sections highlight what is known about the economic conditions of Syrian refugees generally, and women in particular, in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.

LEBANON

Although Lebanon requires refugees to sign a document stating they will not work while living in the country, Syrians seeking refuge here find ways to subsist. In the Akkar region, from where the most comprehensive data is available, UNHCR reports that 32 percent of refugee households have at least one member who works, and only 6 percent of households report having at least one female member employed.34 Overall, 90 percent of employed refugees report that they work within the informal sector.35 Because of the situation in which they find themselves, many Syrian refugee women are entering the workforce for the first time. UNHCR reports:

Substantially more women than men appeared to have begun working: 11 percent of women were working for the first time ever at the time of assessment, compared to only 1 percent of men. This highlights the financial strain being placed on refugee households during extended displacement; data suggests that women were not previously working in Syria and have begun to enter the labour [sic] force in Lebanon in order to contribute to their household income.36

Yet, these refugee women still earn significantly less than their male counterparts.37 On average, men earn $13 a day, compared to only $6 a day for women. Many of these women work in the agricultural sector, where wages are lower. Smaller numbers of refugee women work in the hospitality sector for $15 per day, cleaning for $13 per day, and construction for $10 per day.38

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
Gender norms impede Syrian refugee women’s ability to seek and obtain gainful employment. Some do not and cannot actively seek work because they bear the primary responsibility for home and childcare duties.\(^{39}\) According to UNHCR, 23 percent of women cite having dependents in the home as a reason for not working.\(^{40}\) Employment-seeking behaviors amongst refugees may also play a role in the low number of refugee women able to access work. Because Lebanon bars refugees from working in the formal economy, refugees must go door-to-door asking for work as their main opportunity for securing a job.\(^{41}\) This behavior is considered inappropriate for women.

JORDAN

Bureaucratic barriers and mounting fear surround the legal parameters of refugees’ right to work in Jordan, and this inhibits Syrian refugees’ ability to find gainful employment. Jordan requires all foreign workers to obtain a one-year renewable work permit from the Ministry of Labour. The law also requires that an employer sponsor the foreign worker. Most permit applicants to work in the following sectors: construction services (32 percent), other services (30 percent), restaurants (17 percent), and agriculture (4 percent).\(^{42}\) In addition to dealing with bureaucratic barriers, many refugees also fear applying for a permit at all. The ILO reports that it is “a common conception amongst both Syrians and Jordanians that Syrian refugees might lose their UNHCR refugee status if they obtain a work permit.”\(^{43}\) As a result, only 10 percent of all Syrian refugees have obtained the legal right to work.\(^{44}\) Instead, many Syrian refugees continue to search for work in the informal sector, mainly finding jobs through referrals from family or friends.\(^{45}\)

Syrian refugees continued pursuit of low-skilled labor has negatively impacted Jordanian nationals. The ILO reports that between 2011 and 2014, unemployment increased for Jordanians, from 14.5 percent to 22 percent.\(^{46}\) Further, because refugees are willing to work for lower wages, authorities find it increasingly difficult to enforce the minimum wage for nationals.\(^{47}\)

Like Lebanon, legal restrictions and social norms hamper Syrian refugee women’s ability to find work. In Jordan, the ILO estimates that only 7 percent of all refugee women work.\(^{48}\) While both men and women cite the inability to obtain a work permit as a major obstacle to earning income, women also cite household responsibilities and family objections to working outside the home as key reasons for their unemployment.\(^{49}\) Furthermore, the ILO also indicates that nearly every Syrian refugee child who is working in Jordan is male.\(^{50}\) Girls remain at home.

---

41 Ibid.
44 Ibid, 6.
46 Ibid, np.
48 Ibid, np.
50 Ibid.
Since 2011, an estimated 2.4 million Syrians have taken refuge in Turkey. As of the end of 2015, only 7,351 Syrian refugees had been granted work permits and only a small number had been granted Temporary Protection (TP) to work within the refugee community, usually as teachers or doctors in the refugee camps. The majority of Syrian refugees work in the informal economy, a direct result of the Turkish government’s ban on refugees’ legal right to work, which was recently lifted in January 2016. Now that the ban has been lifted, many of the Syrian refugees currently working in the informal economy have the opportunity to formalize their employment, meaning they can seek worker protections such as a minimum wage.

Initially, the Turkish government cited the high unemployment of Turkish nationals as the main factor for denying work permits for Syrian refugees. Refugee participation in the informal economy is also of concern for the Turkish government, as Turkish communities complain that Syrian refugees working illegally accept lower wages and push Turks out of the labor market. However, a 2015 study conducted by the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation found that Syrian refugees actually do not compete with Turks for jobs. Instead, refugees meet a demand for unskilled labor that otherwise goes unfilled by Turks. Additionally, the Government of Turkey has stated that one reason for granting refugees work permits was to stem the flow of the qualified workforce to European countries.

Syrian women enter the Turkish labor force in low numbers, comparable to Lebanon and Jordan. A 2014 study conducted by Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) found that only 13 percent of Syrian women surveyed had at some point held a form of income-generating employment. 3.7 percent of Syrian women refugees reported they worked as teachers, 0.8 percent as garment makers, 0.7 percent as farmers or farm workers, 0.6 percent as beauticians, 0.3 percent as nurses or midwives, and 7.1 percent in another industry. 57.7 percent of Syrian women surveyed listed “housewife” as their primary, unpaid occupation. Additionally, nearly half of women said they would not want to seek employment even if they were provided the opportunity to do so.

Regarding those living in refugee camps, the Turkish AFAD determined that the patriarchal cultural structure was the biggest obstacle for women, preventing many women from leaving their tents, and therefore inhibiting access to many forms of income-generating employment. Various organizations and agencies working on the ground aim to address the economic challenges Syrian refugees face in varied ways.

---

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid, 74.
Organizations on the Ground

Humanitarian programs to create jobs for refugees have only benefited a few thousand refugees, leaving millions to fend for themselves.

Organizations on the ground engage in a litany of activities to help Syrian refugees generally, and women in particular, cope with their displacement. The following section details several types of programs that fall within this scope. While many of these programs have enjoyed some success, all organizations working in this space confront two pervasive challenges: host country legal restrictions on the right to work for refugees and social norms relating to women working outside the home.

Given the lack of formal opportunities for refugees, UN agencies and international NGOs frequently use livelihood programs to create opportunities for refugees to earn an income and provide for themselves. Yet, they often struggle to balance supporting the host states’ needs and offering solutions to refugees who are falling below basic, minimum standards of living. Large agencies affiliated with the UN and powerful donor countries are less willing to develop programs that promote “employment” opportunities for refugees because these organizations are required to follow the laws of the host countries, where they operate as guests.

For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) leads a consortium of agencies that have developed a Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (3RP) that supports all aspects of relief and recovery for the Syrian crisis, including improving livelihoods and work opportunities for refugees throughout the region. In June 2015, the 3RP update reported that 156 livelihood projects in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have assisted 9,750 refugees with access to wageearning opportunities, and 16,879 have been trained in a marketable skill or service. However, these figures do not distinguish between refugees earning an income in the informal sector or the formal economy, nor does the data provide disaggregated figures vis-à-vis gender. These programs have had successful but minimal reach considering the number of refugees living in these host countries. One reason for this may be that these organizations struggle to maximize their impact while also working within host countries’ legal parameters regarding refugees.

Rather than directly addressing refugee access to employment opportunities, the World Bank works to support refugees by addressing infrastructure challenges in host countries. To reduce the burden of welcoming refugees, the World Bank developed initiatives in Jordan and Lebanon to supplement the cost of providing refugees access to education, health care, and municipal services such as trash collection.

In many respects, small local organizations are better able to operate under the radar of national authorities, helping refugees obtain the skills necessary for employment and to make connections with small businesses willing to hire refugees. For example, in Turkey, a local NGO, Rizk, works on employing Syrian refugees in local businesses, placing 1,400 refugee men and women in jobs in 2014. While these are pos-

itive developments, Rizk’s success is still limited. There are thousands of outstanding applicants waiting in line likely due to the high number of refugees seeking employment and the low number of jobs available. Other NGOs working on livelihoods initiatives have tried a number of approaches to increasing refugee income, including giving cash grants and payments through debit cards and setting up vocational training classes.\(^{64}\)

Acknowledging the cultural barriers that prevent Syrian refugee women from working, some organizations train Syrian refugee women in economic activities they can conduct in their home, but these endeavors have also enjoyed only limited success. For example, the Italian NGO INTERSOS provides Syrian women in Lebanon with makeup kits and beauty skills that can be used in private in-home services or by working in salons. Yet, women participating in this program said their husbands still showed concern that their participation would put them in public contact with men outside their family, which was perceived as culturally problematic.\(^{65}\) In Turkey, AFAD also acknowledged that it is essential to create employment opportunities in the camps that do not require women to leave their tents.\(^{66}\)

In Lebanon, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) livelihoods program developed a training program to enhance financial literacy for women, covering topics such as household-level budgeting, debt management, negotiation, savings, and banking services.\(^{67}\) Although this is a new and on-going initiative, initial reports from those on the ground show that women have more confidence to make decisions about the needs of their household. Financial training is an important tool to empower women who traditionally have not been allowed to control financial resources in the home. This type of empowerment could be a first step in shifting social conventions that relegate women to the domestic sphere.

Overall, there are various methods being used to support refugees, many of which are specifically tailored to address the needs of women. However, these programs face persistent barriers regarding refugees’ legal right to work in each country, as well as pervasive social attitudes that constrain women’s ability to work outside of the home. Changing negative perceptions of women’s participation in the workforce, including having contact with men outside of their families, will be an important aspect of empowering Syrian women.

---

67 Ibid.
Addressing Legal Barriers
to Syrian Refugees’ Right to Work

The International Labor Organization (ILO) recommends that a formal migrant worker program be established to regularize the employment of refugees in host countries.

A legal right to work would have a positive impact both on Syrian refugees and their host countries. Refugees would benefit from formal employment and the associated protections, while host countries would benefit from an increased tax base and a larger supply of workers to fill unmet labor demands, as evidenced in Turkey. Additionally, if refugees were able to pay taxes on their income to the host state, it could alter perceptions that the Syrian population has only created negative economic conditions for their neighbors. If refugees are shown to be contributing members of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, etc., then other nations in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait may also be willing to open their doors to this population. The ILO recommends that a formal migrant worker program be established to regularize the employment of refugees in host countries. Businesses in the host countries can hire refugees (where legal) and/or advocate for policies that are more refugee-friendly.

Importantly, there also exists a fear that providing refugees with a legal right to work incentivizes them not to return to Syria when the war ends. Whether or not refugees return home when the war concludes, the fact remains that the current average length of displacement due violent conflict is roughly 17 years. Thus, there is an incredibly high likelihood that Syrian refugees will live in exile in these host countries for at least a decade or two, if not longer. Given this reality, host countries should find ways to better integrate refugees into their respective workforces.

As previously discussed, social norms and patriarchal culture prevent many Syrian refugee women from seeking income-earning employment, reducing the number of potential income earners in each household and thus limiting the economic stability that refugee families can achieve. Beyond this, the economic strain placed on refugee families force them to cope in ways that uniquely and adversely impact women and girls.

Under the precarious conditions of life in a refugee camp, many Syrian refugee families turn to early marriage practices as a coping mechanism to secure more financial support and protect their daughters’ purity. This practice is well documented in Jordan, where UNICEF reports that 25 percent of all Syrian marriages registered in 2013 were with girls between the ages of 15-17, and this number increased to 31.7 percent of all marriages in 2014.69

While often perceived as the best coping mechanisms for families in crisis, early marriage actually hurts the earning futures for the Syrian refugee population. A Save the Children study conducted in Jordan points out that child brides tend to come from poor families, and remain poor throughout their lives.70

The social norms that keep women from actively seeking gainful employment and that create conditions whereby girls are increasingly married off at younger ages pervade the situation in which Syrian women refugees find themselves. These conditions impede these women’s ability to participate as active agents in the economic health of their own and their families’ futures.

---

Looking Ahead

Improving female participation in the labor force is a key to strengthening the ability of Syrian women... to chart a better future for themselves and their families.

The Syrian civil war is not expected to end anytime soon, and it is evident that for the foreseeable future there will be millions of Syrian refugees living in exile across MENA and in Europe. It is equally apparent that their inability to find gainful employment in host countries exacerbates the precarious situation in which they find themselves, and leaves more female refugees to fend for themselves while male relatives continue to migrate in search of work. Despite international and local humanitarian efforts to help refugees access employment, Syrian refugees still face a myriad of challenges in earning the income they need to meet their basic needs.

As this paper reveals, all Syrian refugees living across MENA confront legal barriers that impede their ability to find viable income-generating employment opportunities. Women are additionally disadvantaged, as they are becoming heads of household for the first time and also face social barriers that relate to gender and work. The status quo of leaving refugees to fend for themselves on limited humanitarian contributions is unsustainable, and leaves the economic potential of millions of people untapped. This is expressly the case when it comes to women. Improving female participation in the labor force is a key to strengthening the ability of Syrian women, both those living inside the country and those living outside the country as refugees, to chart a better future for themselves and their families.

Netting a trade and an income in northern Lebanon
Photo by Russell Watkins/DFID